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THE SPEED OF SOCIAL LEARNING
MATAN HAREL1, ELCHANAN MOSSEL2, PHILIPP STRACK3, AND OMER TAMUZ4
Abstract. We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly
observing each others’ actions. We find that, in the long-run, observing discrete actions
of others is significantly less informative than observing their private information: only a
fraction of the private information is transmitted. We study how this fraction depends on
the distribution of private signals.
In a large society, where everyone’s actions are public, this fraction tends to zero, i.e., only
a vanishingly small share of the information is aggregated. We identify groupthink as the
cause of this failure of information aggregation: As the number of agents grows, the actions
of each individual depend more and more on the past actions of others, thus revealing less
private information.
1. Introduction
In many economic situations, the costs and benefits of possible choices are initially un-
known, but can be learned over time. Frequently, agents learn not only from their own
experiences, but also from observing the choices made by others facing the same decision.
For example, a monopolistic seller in a local market learns about the optimal price both by
observing her own demand, as well as by observing the prices other sellers charge in similar
markets. Likewise, observing who one’s social network friends support might influence who
one believes to be the better candidate in an election.
In many such situations information arrives over time, and all agents eventually learn.
Two important questions arise: How quickly do they learn, and more interestingly, how does
the nature of their social interaction affect their speed of learning?
We study a group of agents who interact repeatedly and try to learn a common state
from private signals, as well as from the actions of the others. Every period, each agent
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observes a private signal, takes an action to maximize her expected utility, and observes
others’ actions. We study settings with purely informational externalities, i.e., each agent’s
utility is independent of the others’ actions, and hence agents care about others’ actions only
because they provide information. As in the herding literature (Bikhchandani et al., 1992;
Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Chamley, 2004), private signals are independent
of actions, and consequently agents have no experimentation motive. Since each agent can
learn the state from her private signals, the question is not whether or not she learns the
state eventually, but rather how quickly she does so.
When agents’ action spaces are sufficiently rich (e.g., when sellers choose prices from a
continuum), actions reveal beliefs, and thereby reveal all the payoff relevant information
that is contained in the private signals. In this case no information is lost, and the joint
decision problem reduces to that of a single agent. However, when actions are discrete (e.g.,
when sellers must choose one of finitely many prices), we show that information is lost. We
quantify the information loss in terms of the speed of learning – the exponential rate at which
the probability of choosing a suboptimal action vanishes – and identify two forces that lead
to inefficiently slow learning.
The first force, which we call the coarseness effect, is directly due to the fact that discrete
actions are only a coarse signal about beliefs. We study this force in an environment with
two agents, where agent 1 observes the actions of agent 2, while agent 2 observes only her
own private signals. Since actions are observed unidirectionally, the actions an agent takes
do not influence the information she will receive in future periods. Hence, it is optimal for
each agent to behave myopically - that is, to choose the action that maximizes her expected
utility in each period.
We find that in the long-run agent 1, who can observe 2’s actions, learns as quickly as
she would learn if she would observe some fixed fraction of agent 2’s private signals (but
not her actions). For Normal signals, this fraction equals 9/16 = 56.25%. That is, agent 1
learns equally quickly when she observes agent 2’s actions (but not her signals) and when
she sees 56.25% of agent 2’s private signals (but not her actions). We calculate this fraction
for arbitrary distributions of signals, and show that it ranges from zero to one, so that,
depending on the distribution, it may be the case that almost all of the information is lost,
or it may be that almost none is lost. Perhaps surprisingly, this fraction is independent
of the agent’s utility and set of actions. Especially, it does not depend on how finely one
discretizes a continuous action space. Thus, the speed of learning in the continuous action
model cannot be approximated using the speed of learning in discrete actions models, no
matter how fine the discretization.
The second force, which we call the groupthink effect, emerges when agents observe each
other bidirectionally. In this case an agent’s actions depend on her higher order beliefs,
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and thus observing her actions may reveal less information about her private signals. We
study this force in an environment where n ≥ 2 agents all observe each others’ actions. For
tractability, we assume that agents are myopic.1
Groupthink occurs when a consensus on an action forms in the initial periods, making
it optimal for an agent to continue taking the consensus action, even when her private
information indicates otherwise. This is similar to the phenomenon of herding in models
where the agents act sequentially. We show that typically, after a wrong consensus forms,
all agents quickly observe private signals providing strong evidence for choosing the correct
action, and yet a long time may pass until any of them breaks the wrong consensus. This
leads to long periods of little information aggregation and a slow speed of learning.2
With more agents, each individual agent is less likely to break a wrong consensus. On
the other hand, the number of potential dissenters is larger, and so a priori it is not obvious
whether groupthink becomes more or less likely. We show that the inefficiency (measured
as the share of information that is lost) associated with the groupthink effect increases with
the number of agents. Quantitatively, even as the number of agents goes to infinity, the
speed of learning from actions stays bounded by a constant, whereas the speed of learning
from the aggregated signals, which is proportional to the number of agents, goes to infinity.
Thus, almost all information is lost; the agents’ belief has the same precision as would result
from observing a vanishingly small fraction of the available private signals. For example,
for normal signals, a group of n agents observing each others’ actions learns asymptotically
slower than a group of 4 agents who share their private signals; this holds for any n! Hence,
at most a fraction of 4/n of the private information is transmitted through actions.
A natural alternative measure of the speed of learning is the expected discounted payoff
loss, relative to a case where all private signals are public. This measure depends on the
mistake probabilities in the early periods of the game, which, even for the single agent case,
are in general intractable. As a consequence, previous work has studied asymptotic (long
run) rates of learning (e.g., Vives, 1993; Chamley, 2004; Duffie and Manso, 2007; Duffie et al.,
2009, 2010; Jadbabaie et al., 2013; Molavi et al., 2015), and we do the same. In particular,
Jadbabaie et al. (2013) and Molavi et al. (2015) study the rate of learning in an almost
identical setting, with boundedly rational agents. Asymptotic rates have been studied in
other settings in which it is difficult to analyze the short-term dynamics (e.g., Hong and
1Myopic behavior is the common solution concept in much of the social learning literature (for example
Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 1983; Parikh and Krasucki, 1990; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Duffie et al., 2010, 2009;
Duffie and Manso, 2007; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Vives, 1993); we discuss this further below.
2Our prediction seems to be in line with the findings in the empirical literature: Da and Huang (2016, page
5) find in a study on forecasters “that private information may be discarded when a user place weights on
the prior forecasts [of others]. In particular, errors in earlier forecasts are more likely to persist and appear
in the final consensus forecast, making it less efficient.”
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Shum (2004) and Ho¨rner and Takahashi (2016)), and more generally asymptotic results are
common in the field of learning (e.g., Kalai and Lehrer (1993)).
Using asymptotic rates to quantify the speed of learning has the disadvantage that these
rates, in general, convey no information about the initial time periods (and thus expected
payoffs). The reason for this is that the rate of learning describes the probability of making a
mistake only up to an error term which might be large in early periods, but vanishes in later
periods. However, asymptotic rates are tractable, and — as we show — have the further
advantage of being independent of many details of the model, providing a measure that is
robust to changes in such model parameters as the agents’ prior or the exact utility function.
Moreover, the approximation error made in early periods when considering asymptotic
rates need not be large. In fact, in some natural examples, the asymptotic rates correspond
closely to the short-term dynamics and provide the correct economic intuition. We highlight
this by studying a canonical setting of a large group of agents with Normal private signals,
where, as the size of the group is increased, the total precision of their signals is kept constant.
In this case, our results on the learning rates show that the speed of learning tends to zero
as the size of the group grows. By carefully analyzing the learning dynamics in this setting,
we show that this result does not only hold in the long-run, but also in the initial periods,
where the agents learn less and less, the larger the group gets. Specifically, after revealing
some information by their action in the first period, the agents - with high probability for
large groups - get locked into groupthink and ignore their subsequent private signals in many
of the initial periods, choosing instead to follow the majority opinion of the first period.
Our paper is closely related to models of rational herding (Bikhchandani et al., 1992;
Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Chamley, 2004), as we use the same conditional
i.i.d. structure of signals, and utilities depend only on one’s own actions and the state.
The main difference is that in most herding models, each agent acts only once, whereas in
our model, agents take actions repeatedly. An implication of this interaction is a feedback
effect where an agent’s action today influences other agents’ future actions, which in turn
change her own future actions. This entails an additional dimension relative to the herding
literature: the complexity and importance of higher order beliefs. Agents’ actions depend on
beliefs of arbitrarily high order, since, unlike in the herding literature, is it not sufficient to
reason about others’ beliefs, but one must also reason about their beliefs regarding one’s own
beliefs and so on. A contribution of this paper is to provide an analysis of this interaction,
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circumventing the calculation of beliefs, which in such contexts is well known to be intractable
(as discussed for example by Gale and Kariv (2003)3).
In our repeated action setting there may be a strategic incentive to change ones own action
in order to gain more information from future actions of others. This effect does not exist for
rational myopic agents, who do not value future information, and we assume myopic agents.
The same choice is made in most of the learning literature (where signals are private and
agents interact repeatedly) either explicitly (e.g., Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 1983; Parikh
and Krasucki, 1990; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Keppo et al., 2008), or implicitly, by assuming
that there is a continuum of agents (e.g., Vives, 1993; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Duffie and
Manso, 2007; Duffie et al., 2009, 2010). A possible justification for this approach is that
reasoning about the informational effect of one’s actions in such setups requires a level of
sophistication that seems unrealistic in many applications.4
In the herding literature agents either learn or do not learn the state, depending on whether
private signals have bounded likelihood ratios (Smith and Sørensen, 2000). In our model,
the distinction between unbounded and bounded private signals is not important, since the
aggregate of each agent’s private information suffices to learn the state. When agents fail to
learn in the herding literature, it is because they disregard their private signals and follow the
actions of their predecessors. Similar phenomena are described in other works (for example
Vives, 1993; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Mossel et al., 2015), and the same basic mechanism
underlies our groupthink effect.
Potential applications of our results appear in settings in which agents repeatedly learn
from each other. These include the dissemination of information in developing countries
(e.g., Conley and Udry (2010); Banerjee et al. (2013) among many studies), the adoption of
opinions on social networks, and prediction markets where forecasters observe the forecasts of
others (see Da and Huang (2016)). The main lesson we offer is that too much communication
can slow down learning, through the groupthink effect. This lesson may be of interest to
those who study these interactions, as well as to those who design them.
3Gale and Kariv (2003, p.20): “Speeds of convergence can be established analytically in simple cases. For
more complex cases, we have been forced to use numerical methods. The computational difficulty of solving
the model is massive even in the case of three persons. However, the results are sufficiently dramatic that
they suggest the same might be true for more general cases. This is an important subject for future research.”
4The strategic experimentation literature studies the incentive to change one’s action in order to learn
more from others’ future actions. We exclude this strategic incentive by assuming that information arrives
independently of actions and that agents are myopic. In most of this literature signals are public, and thus
all agents share the same belief, whereas for us overcoming the difficulty imposed by complex higher order
beliefs is the main challenge.
5
2. Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Each period, each agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
first observes a signal (or shock) sit ∈ R and then takes an action ait ∈ A. The set of possible
actions is finite: |A| <∞.
2.1. States and Signals. There is an unknown state
Θ ∈ {l, h}
randomly chosen by nature, with probability p0 = P [Θ = h] ∈ (0, 1). Signals si0, si1, . . . are
i.i.d, across agents and over time, conditional on the state Θ, with distribution µΘ. The
distributions µh and µl are mutually absolutely continuous
5 and hence no signal perfectly
reveals the state. As a consequence the log-likelihood ratio of every signal
`it = log
dµh
dµl
(sit)
is well defined (i.e., |`it| <∞) and we assume that it has finite expectation |E [`it] | <∞. We
also assume that priors are generic6, so as to avoid the expository overhead of treating cases
in which the agents are indifferent between actions; the results all hold even without this
assumption.
Our signal structure allows for bounded as well as unbounded likelihoods. A commonly
used special case of our general signal structure are normal signals sit ∼ N (mθ, σ2) with
mean mθ depending on the state and variance σ
2. Another example is that of binary signals
sit ∈ {l, h} which are equal to the state with constant probability P [sit = Θ | Θ] = φ > 1/2.
2.2. Actions and Payoffs. Agent i’s payoff (or utility) in period t depends on her action
ait and next period’s signal s
i
t+1, and is given by u(s
i
t+1, a
i
t) .
7 The signal can be interpreted
as a shock (like demand or interest rate) which influences the payoffs of the different actions
of the agent. Note that u(·, ·) does not depend on the agent’s identity i or the time period t.
This model is equivalent to a model where the agent’s utility u¯(Θ, ait) is unobserved and
depends directly on the state. Formally, we can translate the model where the utility depends
on the signal into the model where it depends on the state by setting it equal to the expected
5That is, every event with positive probability under one measure has positive probability under the other.
6That is, chosen from a Lebesgue measure one subset of [0, 1].
7Note, that observing the utility u(sit+1, a
i
t) does not provide any information beyond the signal s
i
t+1 and
therefore past signals (si1, . . . , s
i
t+1) are a sufficient statistic for the private information available to agent i
when taking an action in period t+ 1.
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payoff conditional on the state θ8
u¯(h, α) := Eh
[
u(sit+1, α)
]
u¯(l, α) := El
[
u(sit+1, α)
]
.
We denote by aθ the action that maximizes the flow payoff in state θ, which we assume is
unique
αθ := arg max
α∈A
u¯(θ, α) .
We call αh, αl the certainty actions and assume that they are distinct (i.e., αh 6= αl), as
otherwise the problem is trivial.
2.3. Information. Each agent observes only her own signals, and not the signals of others.
To learn about the state, agents try to infer the signals of others from their actions. We
consider three closely related information structures: i) a single agent acting in autarky, ii)
two agents where one agent unidirectionally observes the other’s actions, but not vice versa,
and iii) the case where n agents observe each others’ actions bidirectionally.
2.4. Agents’ Behavior. We assume throughout that agents are Bayesian and myopic: they
completely discount future payoffs, and thus at every time period choose the action the
maximizes the payoff at that period. This assumption is without loss of generality, except in
the case of bidirectional observation. We denote by pit the posterior probability that agent
i assigns to the event Θ = h at the beginning of period t. As an agent’s posterior belief pit
is a sufficient statistic for her expected payoff, her action ait depends only on p
i
t. Formally,
there exists a function a? : [0, 1]→ A such that with probability one9
ait = a
?(pit) .
2.5. Examples.
2.5.1. Matching the State. A simple example which suffices to understand all the economic
results of the paper is the case of two actions A = {l, h} where the agent’s expected utility
equals one if she matches the state, i.e.
u¯(θ, α) =
1 if α = θ0 if α 6= θ .
8Throughout, we denote by Eθ [·] := E [· | Θ = θ] and Pθ [·] := P [· | Θ = θ] the expectation and probability
conditional on the state.
9We here say “with probability one” only to rule out the zero probability event that the agent is indifferent.
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In this case the agent simply takes the action to which her posterior belief assigns higher
probability:
ait =
h if pit > 12l otherwise .
2.5.2. Monopolistic Sellers. As an application, consider local monopolistic sellers who want
to learn about the demand for their product and the associated optimal price. Each seller
acts in a different market, so that there are no payoff externalities. The distribution of
demand, however, is the same, so that the realized demand in other markets is informative
about future demands in a seller’s home market.
For concreteness, assume that the sellers are shop owners who are selling a new product,
and that in the high state the number of people entering the store to inquire about the
product is Poisson with mean ρh, while in the low state it is Poisson with mean ρl, which is
less than ρh. After learning the price each customer decides whether or not to buy, depending
on her private valuation. Customers’ private valuations for the product are independent of
the state, and so, after having entered the store, customers reveal no new information about
the state. Thus, the information a seller learns about the state from her own customers is
independent of the price she sets.
When marginal profits are not constant in the volume of sales, a seller will want to set
one price if the state is high, another price if the state is low, and potentially intermediate
prices when she is unsure about the state. Consequently, each seller wants to learn the state
and does so not only by observing the demand in her store, but also by observing the prices
set by other sellers.
3. Results
In this section we describe our results on the speed of learning under the different informa-
tional assumptions (autarky, unidirectional and bidirectional observation). Section 4 derives
the learning dynamics in detail and explains how they lead to the results of this section.
Recall that we consider three information structures: i) a single agent acting in autarky,
ii) two agents where one agent can observe the other’s actions, but not vice versa, and iii)
the case where n agents observe each others’ actions bidirectionally.
In all three cases we derive results on the speed at which agents learn the state. More
precisely, we consider the probability with which an agent i takes a suboptimal action in
period t:
ait 6= αθ .
As the action is suboptimal (given knowledge of the state) we refer to this event as agent i
“making a mistake”, even though she takes the action which is optimal given her information.
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3.1. Autarky. In the single agent case, this probability is well known to decay exponentially,
with a rate ra that can be calculated explicitly in terms of the cumulant generating functions
λh = − log Eh
[
e−z `
]
and λl(z) := − log El
[
ez `
]
:10
Theorem 1. The probability that a single agent in autarky chooses the wrong action in
period t satisfies11
(1) P
[
at 6= αΘ
]
= e−ra·t+o(t) ,
where
ra := sup
z≥0
λh(z) = sup
z≥0
λl(z).
This type of autarky result is classical and can be found, for example, in studies of Bayesian
hypothesis testing (see, e.g. Cover and Thomas (2012, pages 314-316)). For us it serves as a
benchmark for the case when agents try to learn from the actions of others.
3.2. Unidirectional Observation. When agent 1 can observe agent 2’s actions, but not
vice versa, we show that her probability of making a mistake decays exponentially as well, and
calculate the rate in terms of the Fenchel conjugates12 (also known as the convex conjugate
or Legendre Transform) of λθ, λ
?
θ(η) = supz≥0 λθ(z)− z · η.
Theorem 2. The probability with which agent 1 makes a mistake when she observes all past
actions of agent 2 unidirectionally satisfies
P
[
a1t 6= αΘ
]
= e−ru·t+o(t) ,
where
ru := ra + min {λ?h(ra), λ?l (ra)} .
The rate ru depends only on the signal distributions µl, µh, and not on the utility u, the
agents’ prior, or the set of actions A. Of course, changing the set of actions can have a large
impact on the short-term dynamics: a very rich set will reveal much information in the early
periods, while not changing the asymptotic speed. The reason that a larger set of actions
will not change the speed of learning is that in the long-run only the certainty actions convey
information to agent 1 (see Proposition 12).
We find that the rate ru is always strictly larger than ra, so that agent 1 learns faster than
she would have in autarky. Also, it is always strictly lower than 2 ra, which is the rate at
which agent 1 would learn if she could observe all of agent 2’s private signals.
10Here ` is a random variable with a distribution that is equal to that of any of the log-likelihood ratios `it.
The definition of the cumulant generating function differs by a sign from the usual one.
11Here, and elsewhere, we write o(t) to mean a lower order term. Formally a function f : R→ R is in o(t) if
limt→∞ f(t)/t = 0.
12Our definition of the Fenchel conjugate differs by a sign from the usual one.
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Likewise, if agent 2 were to take continuous actions that reveal her beliefs, then agent 1’s
speed of learning would be 2 ra. Thus observing discrete actions rather than continuous ones
causes a drop in the speed of learning. This drop is independent of how many finite actions
are available to agent 2, or what her exact utility function is: for any such choice the learning
rate of agent 1 is the same ru < 2 ra. We thus call this the coarseness effect : a slowdown in
learning that is the result of observing coarse actions rather than precise beliefs.
Agent 1 learns from agent 2’s actions which state she believes to be more likely. However,
agent 1 does not learn the exact strength of agent 2’s belief. This information, about the
certainty of agent 2, would have been useful to agent 1 as it would have allowed her to
decide whether to follow her own private signal or agent 2’s last period action in case the
two disagree. This loss of information causes learning to be slower than it would have been
if agent 1 were to observe 2’s signals directly.
It is important to note that the rate ru with which agent 1 learns has a clear economic
meaning also for intermediate values (ra, 2 ra): If the rate equals ru then the speed at which
the agent learns equals the speed at which she would learn, if she were to observe the fixed
fraction
ru
ra
− 1
of agent 2’s signals. To illustrate this, we consider the example of Normal signals:
Proposition 3. Let µθ be the normal distribution with mean mθ and variance σ
2 > 0. In
this case ru =
25
16
ra.
This implies that agent 1 learns as fast as she would learn if she observed 9/16 ≈ 56%
of agent 2’s private signals, instead of her actions. Equivalently, 7/16 ≈ 44% of agent 2’s
private information is lost en route to agent 1, due to the coarseness effect.
An interesting class of signal structures is that of symmetric distributions µl, µh, such that
the induced log likelihood ratio ` conditioned on Θ = h is identical to the distribution of
−`, conditioned on Θ = l. For example, normal private signals are symmetric, as are binary
private signals. In this case we find that agent 1 asymptotically learns at least as quickly as
she would learn if she were able to observe half of agent 2’s signals directly
Proposition 4. ru > 3/2 ra whenever the signal distributions are symmetric.
We further discuss symmetric distributions in Section 4.5.
In Section 4.6 we discuss other private signals such as Poisson, binary and trinary signals,
and show that the calculation of these rates is often tractable. Numerically, we find that for
trinary signals, ru can be arbitrarily close to 2 ra - the case in which almost no information
is lost. For (asymmetric) Poisson signals, we find that ru can be arbitrarily close to ra, so
that almost all information is lost. This shows that our results are sharp, in the sense that
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no further bounds on the speed of learning can be obtained without imposing additional
restrictions on the distributions of signals.
3.3. Bidirectional Observation. Finally, we consider the case where n agents observe
each others’ actions. When n = 2, we compare the probability of mistake to the probability
of mistake by agent 1 (the observer) in the unidirectional observation case. We find that
this probability is exponentially higher:
Theorem 5. If agent 1 and agent 2 observe each other bidirectionally, there is an r2 < ru
such that
P
[
a1t 6= αΘ
]
= P
[
a2t 6= αΘ
] ≥ e−r2·t+o(t) .
Thus, the fact that agent 2 can now also observe agent 1 hurts agent 1 in the long run,
as compared to the setting in which agent 2 did not observe agent 1. It should be again
emphasized that this statement does not imply anything about the probability of error in
early periods; as a statement about exponential rates it claims that for large enough t, the
probability of mistake by agent 1 in the bidirectional case will be exponentially larger than
in the unidirectional case. Furthermore, agent 2 learns potentially at a faster rate in the
bidirectional case as she might benefit from observing agent 1’s actions.
Our second main result is that for any number of agents the speed of learning is bounded
from above by a constant:
Theorem 6. Suppose n agents all observe each others’ past actions. Given the private signal
distributions, there exists a constant r¯b > 0 such that for any number of agents
P
[
ait 6= αθ
] ≥ e−r¯b·t+o(t).
Thus adding more agents (and with them more private signals and more information)
cannot boost the speed of learning past some bound, and as n tends to infinity more and
more of the information is lost. In the case of normal signals r¯b = 4 ra, and thus, regardless
of the number of agents, the probability of mistake is eventually higher than it would be if
4 agents shared their private signals. Thus for large groups most of the private signals are
effectively lost.
To prove both of these theorems we calculate the asymptotic probability of the event that
all agents choose the wrong certainty action in almost all time periods up to time t. We call
this event groupthink and show that its probability is already high, which implies that the
probability that one particular agent errs at time t is also high. Intuitively, when a wrong
consensus forms by chance in the beginning, it is hard to break and can last for a long time,
with surprisingly high probability. This is due to the fact that agents require their private
signals to be relatively strong in order to choose a dissenting action.
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In fact, conditioned on groupthink, it holds, with high probability, that the private signals
of each agent, which initially indicated the wrong action, eventually indicate the correct
action, but are still ignored due to the overwhelming information provided by the actions of
others (Theorem 29). We thus find the term groupthink an apt description of the phenom-
enon.
Note again, that Theorem 6 is a statement about asymptotic rates. In fact, if one increases
the number of agents while holding the private signal distributions fixed, the probability of
the agents choosing correctly at any given period t > 1 approaches 1. Still, the rate is
bounded, and so the probability of a mistake at later time periods is higher than what one
might expect.
3.4. An Analysis of Early Period Mistake Probabilities. One could alternatively in-
crease the number of agents while holding the total amount of information available to them
constant. As an example, we consider n agents who each receive Normal private signals with
fixed conditional means ±1 and variance n. If such signals were publicly observable they
would be informationally equivalent to a single Normal signal with variance 1 each period.
Thus, as the total amount of information available is bounded, the probability of choos-
ing correctly in the early periods does not tend to one as the number of agents increases.
Furthermore, as each agent learns at most as much from seeing the other agents’ actions as
she would from seeing 3 other agents’ signals (see Section 4.6.1), and the informativeness of
private signals goes to zero as n→∞, the speed of learning tends to zero.
Moreover, a detailed analysis in the case where agents want to match the state (Section
2.5.1) shows that already in the first periods, as the number of agents increases they learn
less and less from each other’s actions, and so the asymptotic result “kicks in” early on (in
the second period):
Theorem 7. Suppose n agents have normal private signals with conditional distributions
N (±1, n) and want to match the state, so that u¯(θ, a) = 1{a=θ}. Then, for every t, the
probability that all agents in the periods {2, 3, . . . , t} choose the action that the majority of
the agents chose in period 1 converges to one as n goes to infinity.
Thus the private signals of periods {2, . . . , t} are with high probability not used in these
periods. Consequently, the actions in these periods are correct only if the action taken by the
majority in the first period is correct. This probability is bounded by Φ(1) ∼ 0.84 for any n.
Of course, this probability can be arbitrarily close to 1/2 if the private signal distributions
has a larger variance. In this case, almost all information is lost even in early periods, if
the number of agents is sufficiently high. In Figure 3.1 we show how the probability that
all agents take the wrong action in the second period increases when the number of agents
increases.
12
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Figure 3.1. In the setting of Theorem 7, this figure charts the probability
that all agents ignore their private signal in the second period, choosing instead
to follow the choice of the majority in the first period, as a function of the
number of agents. We plot even (blue line) and odd (orange line) numbers of
agents in different colors to make the chart more readable.
4. Learning Dynamics
In this section we analyze the learning dynamics under the different informational assump-
tions, in detail. We explain how agents interpret each other’s actions and how they choose
their own. The analysis of these learning dynamics is related to questions in random walks
and large deviations theory. Proving our results requires some mathematical innovation, the
details of which we defer to the appendix.
4.1. Preliminaries. As an agent’s objective is linear in her posterior belief pit, the set of
beliefs where she takes a given action is an interval. It will be convenient to define the agent’s
log-likelihood ratio (LLR) Lit := log p
i
t/(1 − pit). As the LLR is a monotone transformation
of the agent’s posterior belief, and as a myopic agent’s action is determined by her posterior,
the same holds true in terms of LLRs. This can be summarized in the following claim.
Lemma 8. There exist disjoint intervals (L(α), L(α)) ⊂ R∪{−∞,+∞}, one for each action
α ∈ A, such that, with probability one, ait = α if and only if Lit ∈ (L(α), L(α)).
To characterize the agent’s actions it thus suffices to characterize her LLR. Note, that for
the certainty action αl it holds that L(αl) = −∞, and that analogously L(αh) = +∞.
4.2. Autarky. As a benchmark, we first describe the autarky setting where a single agent
acts by himself. In this section we omit the superscript signifying the agent.
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Evolution of Beliefs. In autarky, the posterior probability the agent assigns to the high state
before taking an action in period t is Pt = P [θ = h | s1, . . . , st]. Applying Bayes’ rule yields
that the LLR Lt follows a random walk with increments `t = log
dµh
dµl
(st) equal to the LLR
of the signals the agent observed:
(2) Lt = L0 +
t∑
τ=1
`τ .
Probability of Mistakes. As a consequence of Lemma 8, the probability that the agent chooses
the wrong action in period t when the state equals θ is given by
Pθ
[
at 6= αθ
]
=
Ph
[
Lt ≤ L(αh)
]
if θ = h
Pl
[
Lt ≥ L(αl)
]
if θ = l
.(3)
Hence, to calculate the probability of a mistake one needs to calculate the probability that the
LLR is in a given interval. By (2) the LLR is the sum of increments which are i.i.d. conditional
on the state, and hence (Lt)t is a random walk.
The short-run probability that a random walk is within a given interval is hard to calculate
and depends very finely on the distribution of its increments.13 As this makes it impossible –
even in the single agent case – to obtain any general results on the probability that the agent
makes a mistake, we focus on the long-run probability of mistakes, which can be analyzed
for general signal structures. The long-run behavior of random walks has been studied in
large deviations theory, with one of the earliest result due to Crame´r (1944), who studied
these questions in the context of calculating premiums for insurers. We will use some of
the ideas and tools from this theory in our analysis; a self-contained introduction is given in
Appendix A.
Beliefs. We define the private LLR Rt as the LLR calculated only based on an agent’s private
signals:
Rt := L0 +
t∑
τ=1
`τ .
In the single agent case the private signals are all the available information, so Lt = Rt, but
this will no longer be the case once we consider more agents. Regardless of the number of
agents and the information available to them, the private LLR is a random walk with steps
`t, if we condition on the state. We can therefore use large deviation theory to estimate
the probability that the private LLR Rt deviates from its expectation, conditional on the
state. Let ` have the same distribution as each `t, and define λθ : [0, 1] → R, the cumulant
13The only exception are a few cases where the distribution of the LLR Lt is known in closed form for every
t, such as the Gaussian case. Even in the Gaussian case it seems to us intractable to calculate in closed form
the mistake probability in early periods in the multi-agent case.
14
generating function of the increments of the LLR in state θ by
λh(z) := − log Eh
[
e−z `
]
λl(z) := − log El
[
ez `
]
,
and denote its Fenchel conjugate by
λ?θ(η) := sup
z≥0
λθ(z)− η · z.
The following lemma (proven in the appendix) derives properties of λθ, λ
?
θ which follow from
the fact that `t is the LLR of the signal in period t.
Lemma 9. λθ(z) and λ
?
θ(η) are finite for all z ∈ [0, 1] and η ∈ (El [`] ,Eh [`]). Furthermore,
(4) λh(z) = λl(1− z) and λ∗h(η) = λ∗l (−η)− η .
The private log likelihood ratio Rt concentrates around its conditional expectations, which
are El [`] · t in the low state, and Eh [`] · t in the high state. The asymptotic probability that
the private LLR lies anywhere in between these two extremes is given by the next lemma.
Lemma 10. For any El [`] < η < Eh [`] it holds that14
Ph [Rt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ?h(η)·t+o(t)
Pl [Rt ≥ η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ?l (−η)·t+o(t).
The proof of Lemma 10 in the Appendix uses the properties of λθ and λ
?
θ established in
Lemma 9 to verify that the increments of the LLR process in both states are such that large
deviation theory results are applicable. Lemma 10 allows us to calculate the probability of
a mistake conditional on each state, immediately implying the next theorem, from which
Theorem 1 follows immediately.
Theorem 11. The probability that an agent in autarky chooses the wrong action in period
t satisfies
(5) Pθ
[
at 6= αθ
]
= e−ra·t+o(t) ,
where
ra = λ
?
h(0) = λ
?
l (0) = sup
z≥0
λh(z) = sup
z≥0
λl(z) .
This result is classical and can be found, for example, in studies of Bayesian hypothesis
testing (see, e.g. Cover and Thomas (2012, pages 314-316)). We introduce it to familiarize
the reader with the notation and tools that we will use in the sequel. We also note that
14Here each o(t) denotes a different function, so that the first line can be alternatively written as follows: For
every f(·) with limt→∞ f(t)/t = 0 there exists a g(·) with limt→∞ g(t)/t = 0 such that Ph [Rt ≤ η · t+ f(t)] =
e−λ
?
h(η)·t+g(t).
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it is possible to strengthen the results by replacing the lower order o(t) term by O(log(t))
using the Bahadur-Rao exact asymptotics method (see Dembo and Zeitouni (1998, Pages
110-113) for a detailed derivation). However, such precision will provide little additional
economic insight while significantly complicating the proofs, and thus we will not pursue it.
Note, that the long-run probability of a mistake does not depend on the cut-offs L(αl)
and L(αh) and is hence independent of set of actions A and the utility function u. It is also
independent of the prior. Thus quantifying the speed of learning using the exponential rate
has both advantages and disadvantages: the rate is independent of many details of the model
and depends only on the private signal distributions. It is also tractable and can be explicitly
calculated for many distributions (see Section 4.6). However, it is an asymptotic measure
and in general does not say anything formally about what happens in early periods. The
same is true for many statistical results, like the Central Limit Theorem, which nevertheless
provide helpful intuition about what happens in finite periods.
4.3. Unidirectional Observation and the Coarseness Effect. In the previous section
we analyzed how a single agent learns in autarky. We now turn to a two agent setting where
agent 1 learns from the actions of agent 2, who himself acts in autarky. The results of the
autarky case will be crucial for understanding what inference agent 1 draws from the actions
of agent 2.
In this setting, in addition to her own signals s11, . . . , s
1
t , agent 1 observes agent 2’s past
actions a21, . . . a
2
t−1. Agent 2 only observes her own signals s
2
1, . . . , s
2
t . As agent 2 acts in
autarky, she behaves as described in Section 4.2. For example, in the “matching the state”
setting (Section 2.5.1), the agents’ actions will be given by
a2t =
h if P [Θ = h | s21, . . . , s2t ] > 12l otherwise
(as in autarky) and
a1t =
h if P
[
Θ = h | s11, . . . , s1t , a21, . . . , a2t−1
]
> 1
2
l otherwise
.
Only the Last Action Unidirectionally. To get an intuition let us first assume that agent 1
observes only agent 2’s last action a2t−1. More precisely, we analyze the probability with
which agent 1 will take a wrong action in period t after observing her first t private signals
and the action of agent 2 at time t−1. We study this setup to explain the inference problem
of agent 1 and later, in Section 4.3, extend the analysis to the case where agent 1 sees all of
agent 2’s previous actions.
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Bayes rule yields that the LLR of agent 1 when agent 2 takes the action α is given by
(6) L1t = R
1
t + It(a
2
t−1) ,
where It(a
2
t−1) is the amount by which agent 1’s log-likelihood is shifted when she observes
agent 2 take action a2t−1 in period t− 1:
It(α) := log
Ph
[
a2t−1 = α
]
Pl
[
a2t−1 = α
] .
As the signals of agent 1 and agent 2 are independent, R1t is a random walk conditional on
the state. The next proposition shows that there are three different types of inference It(α)
agent 1 can draw from agent 2’s behavior.
Proposition 12. The function It(a) satisfies
It(a) =

−ra · t+ o(t) if α = αl
+ra · t+ o(t) if α = αh
o(1) if α /∈ {αl, αh}
.
When agent 2 takes a certainty action α ∈ {αl, αh} agent 1 believes that agent 2 has
strong evidence for the state in which agent 2’s action is optimal. If agent 2 does not take a
certainty action α /∈ {αl, αh} agent 1 believes that agent 2 must have gotten a sequence of
very uninformative signals as she knows that agent 2’s belief is bounded away from certainty.
As a consequence the influence that agent 2’s action has on agent 1’s LLR It(α) vanishes for
large t in this case.
The fact, that the amount by which a full certainty action of agent 2 shifts agent 1’s
belief is asymptotically linear in the period t, with slope equal to the rate ra, follows as, by
Theorem 11, the probability of a mistake in autarky vanishes at the rate ra:
It(α
l) = log
Ph
[
a2t−1 = α
l
]
Pl
[
a2t−1 = αl
] = logPh [a2t−1 = αl]− logPl [a2t−1 = αl]
= log
(
e−ra·t+o(t)
)− o(1)
= −ra · t+ o(t) .
Intuitively, as agent 1 knows that agent 2, who acts in autarky, will take a suboptimal
action approximately with probability e−ra·t, agent 1 shifts her LLR by approximately −ra · t
when she sees that agent 2 chose αl, and shifts by +ra · t when she sees agent 2 chose αh.
When agent 1 sees agent 2 take an action that is not optimal in either state she concludes
that agent 2 is uninformed and ignores her action.
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Probability of Mistakes. Let us first consider the case of the high state. Recall that the LLR
of agent 1 is the sum of the LLRs of her private signals R1τ as well as the inference It(a
2
t−1)
she draws from agent 2’s action
L1t = R
1
t + It(a
2
t−1) =

R1t − ra · t+ o(t) if a2t−1 = αl
R1t + ra · t+ o(t) if a2t−1 = αh
R1t + o(1) if a
2
t−1 /∈ {αl, αh},
(7)
where the second equality follows from Proposition 12. As shown in Lemma 8 agent 1 makes
a mistake in the high state (i.e., does not choose αh) whenever her likelihood is below L(ah).
Thus, when a2t−1 = α
l, agent 1 does not choose αh whenever R1t ≤ ra·t+o(t). We can estimate
the probability of this event using Lemma 10: it is e−λ
?
h(ra)·t+o(t). A similar calculation for
the other two cases yields
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh | a2t−1 = α
]
= Ph
[
L1t ≤ L(αh) | a2t−1 = α
]
(8)
=

e−λ
?
h(+ra)·t+o(t) if α = αl
e−λ
?
h(−ra)·t+o(t) if α = αh
e−λ
?
h(0)·t+o(t) if α /∈ {αl, αh}
.
To calculate the overall probability of a mistake in state h we calculate the probability with
which the three above cases occur in Appendix C. We illustrate this type of calculation here
by solving the simplest case where agent 1 chooses a wrong action and agent 2 chooses the
correct action αh. By Theorem 11 the probability that agent 2 chooses the correct action
a2t−1 = α
h satisfies
Ph
[
a2t−1 = α
h
]
= 1− e−ra+o(t)
As a consequence the probability that agent 1 chooses a wrong action and agent 2 chooses
the correct action equals
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh and a2t−1 = ah
]
= Ph
[
a1t 6= αh | a2t−1 = ah
]× Ph [a2t−1 = αh]
= e−λ
?
h(−ra)·t+o(t)
(
1− e−ra·t+o(t))
= e−λ
?
h(−ra)·t+o(t) .
The analysis of the other two cases in Appendix C uses similar arguments and leads to the
following result:
Proposition 13. The probability that agent 1 makes a mistake if she observes agent 2’s last
action unidirectionally satisfies
Pθ
[
a1t 6= αh
]
= e−ru·t+o(t) ,
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where ru := ra + min {λ?h(ra), λ?l (ra)} = min {λ?l (−ra), λ?h(−ra)}.
Observing All Past Actions Unidirectionally. We have so far determined the rate at which
agent 1 makes a mistake when she can observe only the last action of agent 2. As agent 1
can always ignore additional information, it follows that her speed of learning is (weakly)
greater when she can observe all past actions of agent 2.
Thus the question is whether agent 1 can learn useful information from agent 2’s earlier
actions, and whether the rate at which agent 1 learns if she observes all of agent 2’s actions
is strictly higher than the rate at which she learns when she can only observe agent 2’s last
action.
Agent 2’s last period action reveals which state she considers more likely. Hence, her
previous actions will only help to assess how much more likely agent 2 considers that state.
This information is helpful for agent 1 as it allows her to ignore agent 2’s action whenever
she believes her evidence to be relatively weak, which is the case when agent 2 switched her
action recently. As a consequence, agent 1 is strictly less likely to make a mistake whenever
all actions of agent 2 are public information.
Our next result shows, however, that in the long-run this effect is vanishingly small, and
agent 1 does not significantly benefit from this information: the rate at which she learns
exactly equals the rate when she can only observe the last action of agent 2.
Theorem 14. The probability with which agent 1 makes a mistake when she observes all
past actions of agent 2 unidirectionally satisfies
P
[
a1t 6= αΘ
]
= e−ru·t+o(t) .
Here ru = ra + min {λ?h(ra), λ?l (ra)} = min {λ?l (−ra), λ?h(−ra)} is the same rate that is
defined in Proposition 13, and thus this theorem is a restatement of Theorem 2.
The proof of Theorem 14 argues that it is, in the long-run, approximately equally likely
that agent 2 takes the wrong certainty action in the last period and that agent 2 takes the
wrong certainty action in all periods. As we explain in the appendix, this result follows from
the same logic as Bertrand’s classical Ballot Theorem (Bertrand (1887)), which states that
the probability that a random walk deviates significantly from its expectation at time t is
comparable to the probability that it deviates at all periods prior to time t. Specifically,
the ratio between these probabilities scales like 1/t, and therefore, having a sub-exponential
dependence on t, does not affect the exponential rate.
To understand how fast agent 1 learns in this setting, we first note that min {λ?h(ra), λ?l (ra)} >
0, and so ru > ra (see Claim 24). Thus the rate of learning when observing agent 1 is strictly
higher than when learning in autarky. Second, ru < 2ra (Claim 25), so that the speed of
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learning is strictly less than it would be if agent 1 had access to all of agent 2’s private
signals.
An illustrative example is that of Normal signals, where sit ∼ N(mθ, σ2) for some ml 6= mh
and σ > 0. We calculate in Section (4.6.1) that in this case λ?l (η) = λ
?
h(η) = ρ(η/ρ− 1)2/4,
where ρ = (mh −ml)2 /(2σ2). Thus ra = ρ/4, and, as one would expect, the rate of learning
in autarky is higher the more separated the private signal distribution. More interestingly,
it follows that ru =
25
16
ra, for any value of σ
2.
4.4. Bidirectional Observation and the Groupthink Effect. In this section we con-
sider n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent observes a sequence of private signals si1, . . . , sit, and the
action taken by other agents in previous periods (ajτ )τ<t,j 6=i. In this setting we prove Theo-
rems 5 and 6. As before, we consider myopic agents who completely discount future payoffs,
and thus at each period choose the action that maximizes their expected payoffs at that
period. For example, in the “matching the state” setting (Section 2.5.1), the agents’ actions
will be given by
ait =
h if P [Θ = h | (s2τ )τ≤t, (ajτ )τ<t, j 6=i] > 12l otherwise .
The Probability that All Agents Make a Mistake in Every Period. Let Gt be the event that
all agents choose the action αl in all time periods up to t:
Gt = ∩ni=1 ∩tτ=1
{
aiτ = α
l
}
.
To simplify the exposition we assume in the main text that Gt has strictly positive proba-
bility.15
Conditioned on Θ = h, the event Gt is the event that all the agents are, and always
have been, in unanimous agreement on the wrong action αl. We thus call Gt the groupthink
event. The probability of Gt provides a lower bound on the probability that an agent makes
a mistake in period t, conditioned on Θ = h.
This event can be written as G1t ∩ · · · ∩Gnt , where Git is the event that agent i chooses the
wrong action αl in every period τ ≤ t. To calculate the probability of Gt, it would of course
have been convenient if these n events were independent, conditioned on Θ. However, due to
the fact that the agents’ actions are strongly intertwined, these events are not independent;
given that agent 1 played αl in all time periods, agent 2 is more likely to do the same. This
15This is the case, for example, if the prior is not too extreme relative to the maximal possible private signal
strength, or if the private signals are unbounded. Otherwise, it may be the case that agents never take the
wrong certainty action in some initial periods, for example if the prior is extreme and the private signals are
weak. In Appendix E we drop this assumption, slightly change the definition of Gt, and formally show that
all our results also hold in general.
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poses a difficulty in the analysis of this model that is a direct consequence of the fact that
the agents’ actions are intricately dependent on their higher order beliefs.
Decomposition in Independent Events. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that Gt can never-
the-less be written as the intersection of conditionally independent events. We now describe
how this can be done.
Lemma 15. There exists a threshold (qτ )τ such that the event Gt equals the event that no
agent’s private LLR Ri hits the threshold q before period t
Gt =
n⋂
i=1
{Riτ ≤ qτ for all τ ≤ t} .
The proof of Lemma 15 in Appendix E shows this result recursively. Intuitively, whenever
Gt−1 occurs, all agents take action αl up to time t− 1. Hence, conditional on Gt−1, whether
agent i takes the action αl at time t depends only on Rit. As α
l is the most extreme action
it follows that the set of private LLRs where the agent takes the action αl must be a half-
infinite interval and is thus characterized by a threshold q. By symmetry, this is the same
threshold for all agents.
Calculating the Thresholds. To calculate the qt’s we consider agent j’s decision problem at
time t, conditioned on Gt−1. The information available to her is her own private signals (and
in particular her private log-likelihood ratio Rjt , which is a sufficient statistic for Θ), and
in addition the fact that all other agents have chosen αl up to this point. But the latter
observation is equivalent to knowing that all the other agent’s private log-likelihood ratios
have been under the thresholds q in all previous time periods! Formally, knowing Gt−1 is
equivalent to knowing that
W it−1 := {Riτ ≤ qτ for all τ ≤ t− 1}
has occurred for all 1 < i ≤ n.
This leads to the following recursive characterization of the threshold q.
Proposition 16. The threshold qt is characterized by the recursive relation
(9) qt = L(α
l)− (n− 1) · log Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] .
Having established this additional connection between the events W it and the thresholds
(qτ )τ , we next explain that qt is asymptotically linear with some slope q, so that
qt = q · t+ o(t),
and estimate the probability of the event W it in terms of q.
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We show in the appendix (Claim 27) that Pl
[
W it−1
]
is essentially a constant. It follows
that if we take the limits of (9) divided by t, the contribution of the denominator on the
right hand side vanishes, and we arrive at
lim
t→∞
qt
t
= −(n− 1) · lim
t→∞
1
t
logPh
[
W it
]
.(10)
Note, that it remains to be explained why this limit exists, which indeed we do, in Appendix
E. Thus, if we denote the left hand side of the above display by q = limt→∞ qt/t, then
(11) Ph
[
W it
]
= e−
q
n−1 ·t+o(t).
Since Gt =
⋂n
i=1W
i
t , and since these W
i
t ’s are conditionally independent, we have that
Ph [Gt] = Ph
[
W it
]n
= e−q·
n
n−1 ·t+o(t).(12)
We thus turn to calculating q. To this end we show in the appendix (Theorem 23) that
the probability of the event W it , which is the event that the private LLR R
i
τ is below the
threshold qτ for all τ ≤ t, is comparable to the probability of the subevent {Rit ≤ qt} that the
private LLR is below the threshold just at the last time period t. In particular, both have
the same rate, conditioned on Θ = h. The large deviations estimate (Lemma 10) implies
that
P
[
Rit ≤ qt
]
= e−λ
?
h(q)·t+o(t),
and so, since W it has the same rate as {Rit ≤ qt},
Ph
[
W it
]
= e−λ
?
h(q)·t+o(t)
as well. Thus it follows from (11) that q, the asymptotic slope of the thresholds (qt), is the
solution to the fixed point equation
(13) q = (n− 1)λ?h(q).
Note that q depends only on the private signal distributions, through λ?h. Since λ
?
h is non-
negative and decreasing, this equation will always have a unique solution. For example,
when n = 2 and private signals are normal, we get that q = 4
√
2−1√
2+1
ra ≈ 0.69ra.
Having calculated q, we now also know from (12) the rate
rg =
n
n− 1q
of the event Gt that all agents take the wrong action in all periods up to time t. This provides
a bound on the speed of learning in this setting, conditioned on Θ = h.
A simple convexity argument now yields the following claim.
Claim 17. For any number of agents n it holds that rg < Eh [`].
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Noting, that
Ph
[
ait 6= αh
] ≥ Ph [Gt] = e−rg ·t+o(t),
and repeating this calculation when conditioning on the low state, we have proved Theorem 6,
for r¯b = min {Eh [`] ,−El [`]}. In the case of Normal private signals, r¯b = 4ra.
In the case of n = 2 agents, we get that q is given by the fixed point equation q = λ?h(q),
and that
Ph
[
ait
] ≥ Ph [Gt] = e−2q·t+o(t).
In the normal signal case this rate is about 1.37ra, and is in particular less than ru =
25
16
ra ≈
1.56ra. The following claim states that this is true in general:
Claim 18. 2 · q < ru.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5 and the analysis of the case of bidirectional obser-
vations. The next section will consider the special case of symmetric private signal distribu-
tions, in which more can be said about the speeds of learning.
4.5. Symmetric Private Signal Distributions. Many natural examples of private signal
distribution are, in a sense, invariant to renaming the states. Formally, we say that the
private signal distributions are symmetric if the distribution of the induced log likelihood
ratio ` conditioned on Θ = h is identical to the distribution of−`, conditioned on Θ = l. This,
for example, is the case for Normal private signals where µθ = N (mθ, σ2). For symmetric
signals we can make a few additional observations.
First, we note that symmetry implies that λh = λl and likewise λ
?
h = λ
∗
l . We thus, in
this section, omit the subscripts. Since in general λh(z) = λl(1 − z), we have that in this
symmetric case λ(z) = λ(1− z), or that λ is symmetric to reflection around z = 1/2.
Recall that ra, the rate of learning in autarky, is equal to λ
?(0) = maxz≥0 λ(0). Since
λ(z) = λ(1 − z), and since λ is concave, this maximum is attained at z = 1/2, and so we
have that ra = λ(1/2). It thus follows from (16) that
ra = − log
∫ √
dµl
dµh
(s)dµh(s).
This is also known as the Bhattacharyya distance (Bhattacharyya (1943)) between the two
distributions, and is a commonly used measure of the distance between distributions.
Recall that ru = λ
∗(−ra) = maxz≥0 λ(z) + raz. Substituting z = 1/2 yields
ru ≥ λ(1/2) + ra/2 = 3
2
ra.
Since the maximum is not attained at z = 1/2 (since λ′(1/2) = 0 6= ra), we have strict
inequality, and so ru >
3
2
ra. Thus, in the symmetric case there is a stronger lower bound
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on the speed of learning in the unidirectional case, or, equivalently, an upper bound on how
much can be lost due to the coarseness effect. We state this formally in the following claim.
Proposition 19. When private signals are symmetric then ru >
3
2
ra.
The example of asymmetric Poisson private signals that we consider in the next section
shows that this it not true in general, and that ru can be arbitrarily close to ra for asymmetric
signals.
4.6. The Speed of Learning for Different Signal Distributions. In this section we
calculate the speeds of learning for some examples of private signal distributions. Our goal is
to show that these calculations are often tractable, and to discuss the range of possible values
of ra and ru, in particular showing that without further restrictions on the signal distributions
one cannot obtain results restricting ru/ra beyond (1, 2) for general distributions and (3/2, 2)
for symmetric distributions.
4.6.1. Normal Private Signals. The simplest example is that of Normal private signals, where
the distribution of private signals is either N (ml, σ2) or N (mh, σ2) for some ml 6= mh. In
this case, if we denote ρ = (mh −ml)2/(2σ2), then an easy calculation shows that
λh(z) = −ρ · z · (z − 1)
and
λ?h(η) =
ρ
4
(η/ρ− 1)2
for η ≤ ρ and λ?h(η) = 0 for η ≥ ρ. Substituting the results of Theorems 11 and 14, we
have that ra = ρ/4 and ru =
25
16
ra. Thus, in the Normal case, learning with unidirectional
observations is always faster by a factor of 25/16 than learning on ones own, regardless of
the means and variance of the signals.
When there are n agents observing bidirectionally, it is easy to calculate, using (13), that
the rate of the groupthink event Gt in which all agents take a wrong action in all time periods
up to time t is
rg = 4
(n−√n)2
(n− 1)2 ra.
In particular, when there are only two agents, rg = 8
√
2−1√
2+1
ra ≈ 1.37 ra, which is less than ru,
as guaranteed by Claim (18).
For n agents, the upper bound on the speed of learning, r¯b, is, in this case, equal to ρ,
which is equal to 4 · ra, so that learning from actions in a group of any size is slower than
learning directly from the private signals of 4 agents.
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4.6.2. Poisson Private Signals. When private signals are Poisson with mean either ρl or ρh
then the expressions for λh, λ
?
h, ra and ru are rather complex. However, they can still be
calculated analytically, for example by using Mathematica. Mathematica’s symbolic engine
can also be used to formally show that for fixed ρl, as one takes larger and larger ρh, the
ratio ru/ra tends to one. Thus, in the case of very different means of the two distributions,
learning in the unidirectional case can be negligibly faster than learning on ones own. If we
fix ρl but this time let ρh tend to ρl, then ru/ra tends to 25/16, as in the Normal case.
4.6.3. Binary Private Signals. A commonly used example of private signals is that of sym-
metric binary signals sit ∈ {l, h} which are equal to the state with constant probability
P
[
sit = Θ | Θ
]
= φ > 1/2.
In this case
λh(z) = − log
[
φ
(
φ
1− φ
)−z
+ (1− φ)
(
φ
1− φ
)z]
.
If we denote by
DKL(p||q) = p log p
q
+ (1− p) log 1− p
1− q
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the Bernoulli distributions B(p) and B(q), then we
can calculate that
ra = DKL(1/2||φ)
and
ru = ra +DKL
(
φˆ||φ
)
,
where
φˆ =
1
2
(
1 +
ra
log(φ/(1− φ))
)
.
Figure 4.1 shows that ru/ra varies between 25/16 (as φ approaches 1/2 and the signals become
uninformative) and 3/2 (as φ tends to 1). Thus, as in the case of Poisson signals, the ratio
ru/ra of less and less informative signals approaches that of Normal signals.
4.6.4. Trinary Private Signals. Another interesting class of private signal distributions are
those that are supported on three values, which we take to be {−1, 0, 1}. We assume 0 to be
uninformative, and thus occurring with the same probability ξ in either state. Intuitively,
1− ξ corresponds to the probability of getting an informative signal. Conditional on getting
an informative signal, we assume the signal to equal +1 with probability p in the high state,
and −1 with probability p in the low state. This signal distribution is symmetric, and thus
by Proposition 19 we have that ru/ra > 3/2. Numerical calculations suggest that for any
0 < ξ < 1, as p tends to 1, the ratio ru/ra tends to 2. Thus, in this case, the speed of
25
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Figure 4.1. The ratio ru/ra as a function of the precision φ in the symmetric
binary signal case.
learning from actions is close to the speed of learning from signals, and hence almost no
information is lost.
5. Conclusion
We introduce asymptotic rates as a measure of the speed of learning in models of repeated
interaction. While asymptotic rates have no formal implications for short run dynamics,
they do provide intuition for the forces at work.16
This article leaves many open questions which could potentially be analyzed using our
approach. What happens when the state changes over time? What happens with payoff
externalities, for example when agents have a motive to coordinate? Of particular interest
is the study of a more complex societal structure of the agents: how fast do they learn for a
given network of observation, which is not the complete network?
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Appendix A. The cumulant Generating Functions, their Fenchel
Conjugates, and Large Deviations Estimates
Large Deviations of Random Walks. The long-run behavior of random walks has been
studied in large deviations theory. We now introduce some tools from this literature, which
will be crucial to understanding the long-run behavior of agents.
Let X1, X2, . . . be i.i.d random variables with E [Xt] = µ and Yt =
∑t
τ=1Xt the associated
random walk with steps Xt. By the law of large numbers we know that Yt should approxi-
mately equal µ ·t. Large deviation theory characterizes the probability that Yt is much lower,
and in particular smaller than η · t, for some η < µ. Under some technical conditions, this
probability is exponentially small, with a rate λ?(η):
P [Yt < η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ∗(η)·t+o(t) ,
or equivalently stated
lim
t→∞
−1
t
logP [Yt < η · t+ o(t)] = λ?(η).
The rate λ? can be calculated explicitly and is the Fenchel Conjugate of the cumulant
generating function of the increments
λ?(η) := sup
z≥0
(− log E [e−z X1]− η · z) .
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The first proof of a “large deviation” result of this flavor is due to Crame´r (1944), who studied
these questions in the context of calculating premiums for insurers. A standard textbook on
large deviations theory is Dembo and Zeitouni (1998).
In this section we provide an independent proof of this classical large deviations result,
and prove a more specialized one suited to our needs. We consider a very general setting:
we make no assumptions on the distribution of each step Xt, and in particular do not need
to assume that it has an expectation.
Denoting X = X1, The cumulant generating function λ is (up to sign, as compared to the
usual definition) given by
λ(z) = − log E [e−z X] .
Note that when the right hand side is not finite it can only equal −∞ (and never +∞).
Proposition 20. λ is finite on an interval I, on which it is concave and on whose interior
it is smooth (that is, having continuous derivatives of all orders).
Proof. Note that I contains 0, since λ(0) = 0 by definition. Assume λ(a) and λ(b) are both
finite. Then for any r ∈ (0, 1)
λ(r · a+ (1− r) · b) = − log E [e−(r·a+(1−r)·b)·X] = − log E [(e−a·X)r · (e−b·X)1−r] ,
which by Ho¨lder’s inequality is at least r ·λ(a) + (1− r) ·λ(b). Hence λ is finite and concave
on a convex subset of R, or an interval. We omit here the technical proof of smoothness; it
can be found, for example, in Stroock (2013, Theorem 1.4.16). 
It also follows that unless the distribution of X is a point mass (which is a trivial case), λ
is strictly concave on I. We assume this henceforth. Note that it could be that I is simply
the singleton [0, 0]. This is not an interesting case, and we will show later that in our setting
I is larger than that.
The Fenchel conjugate of λ is given by
λ?(η) = sup
z≥0
λ(z)− η · z.
We note a few properties of λ?. First, since λ(0) = 0 and λ(z) < ∞, λ? is well defined
and non-negative (but perhaps equal to infinity for some η). Second, since λ is equal to
−∞ whenever it is not finite, the supremum is attained on I, unless it is infinity. Third,
since λ is strictly concave on I, λ(z) − η · z is also concave there, and so the supremum is
a maximum and is attained at a single point z ∈ I whenever it is finite. Additionally, since
λ is smooth on I, this single point z satisfies λ′(z) = η if z > 0 (equivalently, if λ?(η) > 0).
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I.e., if λ′(z) = η for some z in the interior of I then
(14) λ∗(η) = λ(z)− η · z.
Finally, it is immediate from the definition that λ∗ is weakly decreasing, and it is likewise
easy to see that it is continuous. This, together with (14) and the fact that λ′ is decreasing,
yields that λ?(η) = λ(0) = 0 whenever η ≥ supz≥0 λ′(z). We summarize this in the following
claim.
Proposition 21. Let I be the interval on which λ is finite, and let I? = {η : ∃z ∈ intI s.t. λ′(z) = η}.
Then
(1) λ∗ is continuous, non-negative and weakly decreasing. It is positive and strictly
decreasing on I∗.
(2) λ?(η) = 0 whenever η ≥ supz≥0 λ′(z).
(3) If η ∈ I? and λ′(z) = η then λ∗(η) = λ(z)− η · z.
Given all this, we are ready to state and prove our first large deviations theorem.
Theorem 22. For every η such that η > infz∈I λ′(z) it holds that
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ?(η)·t+o(t).
Proof. For the upper bound, we use a Chernoff bound strategy: for any z ≥ 0
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] = P
[
e−z Yt ≥ e−z·(η·t+o(t))] ,
and so by Markov’s inequality
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≤
E
[
e−z Yt
]
e−z·(η·t+o(t))
.
Now, note that E
[
e−z Yt
]
= e−λ(z)·t, and so
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≤ e−(λ(z)−z·η)·t+z·o(t).
Choosing z ≥ 0 to maximize the coefficient of t yields
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≤ e−λ?(η)·t+o(t),
which is the desired lower bound.
We now turn to proving the upper bound. Denote by ν the law of X, and for some fixed
z in the interior of I (to be determined later) define the probability measure ν˜ by
dν˜
dν
(x) =
e−zx
E [e−zX ]
= eλ(z)−zx,
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and let X˜t be i.i.d. random variables with law ν˜. Note that
E
[
X˜
]
=
E
[
Xe−zX
]
E [e−zX ]
= λ′(z).
Now, fix any η1, η2 such that η1 < η2 < η and λ
′(z) = η2 for some z in the interior of I; this
is possible since η > infz∈I λ′(z). This is the z we choose to take in the definition of ν˜. If we
think of η2 as being close to η then the expectation of X˜, which is equal to η2, is close to η.
We have thus “tilted” the random variable X, which had expectation µ, to a new random
variable with expectation close to η.
We can bound
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ P [η1 · t ≤ Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] =
∫ ηt+o(t)
η1t
1 dν(t),
where ν(t) is the t-fold convolution of ν with itself, and hence the law of Yt. It is easy to
verify17 that dν(t)(y) =ezy−λ(z)·t dν˜(t)(y), and so
= e−λ(z)·t
∫ ηt+o(t)
η1t
ezy dν˜(t)(y),
which we can bound by taking the integrand out of the integral and replacing y with the
lower integration limit:
≥ e(η1p−λ(z))·t
∫ ηt+o(t)
η1t
1 dν˜(t).
Since the law of Y˜t =
∑t
τ=1 X˜t is ν˜
(t), this is equal to
= e(η1z−λ(p))·tP
[
η1 · t ≤ Y˜t ≤ η · t+ o(t)
]
.
Since η1 < E
[
X˜
]
< η we have that limt P
[
η1 · t ≤ Y˜t ≤ η · t+ o(t)
]
= 1, by the law of large
numbers. Hence
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
logP [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ η1z − λ(z),
which, by (14), and recalling that z = (λ′)−1 (η2), can be written as
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
logP [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ −λ∗(η2)− (η2 − η1) · (λ′)−1 (η2).
Taking the limit as η1 approaches η2 yields
(15) lim inf
t→∞
1
t
logP [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ −λ∗(η2).
We now consider two cases. First, assume that η ≤ supz≥0 λ′(z). In this case we can choose
η2 arbitrarily close to η, and by the continuity of λ
∗ we get that
17See, e.g., Durrett (1996, Page 74) or note that the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the law of X and X˜
is ezx−λ(z), and so the derivative between the laws of (X1, . . . , Xt) and
(
X˜1, . . . , X˜t
)
is ez(x1+···+xt)−λ(z)·t.
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lim inf
t→∞
1
t
logP [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ −λ?(η),
or equivalently
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ e−λ?(η)·t+o(t).
The second case is that η > supz≥0 λ
′(z). In this case λ?(η) = 0 (Proposition 21). Also,
(15) holds for any η2 < supz λ
′(z) and thus it holds for η2 = supz≥0 λ
′(z). But then λ?(η2) =
0 = λ?(η), and so we again arrive at the same conclusion. 
The next Theorem is similar in spirit, and in some sense is stronger than the previous, as it
shows that the same rate applies to the event that the sum is below the threshold at all time
periods prior to t, rather than just at period t. It furthermore does not require the threshold
to be linear, but only asymptotically and from one direction; both of these generalizations
are important. This theorem will be useful in analyzing both the unidirectional setting and
the bidirectional setting. Theorem 23 is not an established result, but rather a (modest)
contribution of this paper.
Theorem 23. For every η such that η > infz∈I λ′(z), and every sequence {yt}t∈N with
lim inft yt/t = η and P [Yt ≤ yt] > 0 it holds that
P
[∩tτ=1 {Yτ ≤ yτ}] = e−λ?(η)·t+o(t).
Proof. Let Et be the event ∩tτ=1 {Yτ ≤ yτ}. Let {tk} be a sequence such that limk ytk/tk = η.
For every t let t′ be the largest tk with tk ≤ t. Then by inclusion we have that
1
t
logP [Et] ≤ 1
t′
logP [Yt′ ≤ yt′ ] .
Using the same Chernoff bound strategy of the proof of Theorem 22, we get that
1
t
logP [Et] ≤ −λ? (yt′/t′) .
The continuity of λ implies that taking the limit superior of both sides yields
lim sup
t
1
t
logP [Et] ≤ −λ? (η) ,
or
P [Et] ≤ e−λ?(η)·t+o(t).
To show the other direction, define (as in the proof of Theorem 22) X˜t to be be i.i.d. random
variables with law ν˜ given by
dν˜
dν
(x) = eλ(z)−zx,
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where ν is the law of X, and z ∈ I is chosen so that λ′(z) = η2 for some η1 < η2 < η.
Denoting  = η − η1, it follows from inclusion that
P [Et] ≥ P [Et ∩ {Yt ≥ yt −  · t}] .
Now, the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the laws of (X1, . . . , Xt) and
(
X˜1, . . . , X˜t
)
is
ez(x1+···+xt)−λ(z)·t. Hence
P [Et] ≥ E [1Et · 1Yt≥yt−·t] = E
[
1E˜t · 1Y˜t≥yt−·t · ezY˜t−λ(z)·t
]
,
where E˜t is the event ∩tτ=1
{
Y˜τ ≤ yτ
}
. We can bound this expression by taking ezY˜t−λ(z)·t
out of the integral and replacing it with the lower bound yt −  · t. This yields
P [Et] ≥ ez(yt−·t)−λ(z)·t · P
[
E˜t ∩
{
Y˜t ≥ yt −  · t
}]
.
Now, since the expectation of Y˜t/t is strictly between η = lim inft yt/t and η − , we have
that limt P
[
Y˜t ≥ yt −  · t
]
= 1 by the weak law of large numbers. By the strong law of large
numbers and the Markov Property of
{
Y˜t
}
we have that limt P
[
E˜t
]
> 0;
{
Y˜t
}
is indeed
Markov since
{
X˜t
}
are i.i.d. Thus limt P
[
E˜t ∩
{
Y˜t ≥ yt −  · t
}]
> 0 and
lim inf
t
−1
t
logP [Et] ≤ z · η1 − λ(z) .
Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 22 yields that
P [Et] ≥ e−λ?(η)·t+o(t) . 
Appendix B. Application of Large Deviation Estimates
In this section we prove a number of claims regarding the functions λθ and λ
∗
θ. Recall that
for θ ∈ {h, l}
λh(z) := − log Eh
[
e−z `
]
λl(z) := − log El
[
ez `
]
,
where ` is a random variable with the same law as any `it, and
λ?θ(η) = max
z
λθ(z)− η · z.
We first note that by the definition of λθ we have that
(16) λh(z) = − log
∫
exp
(
−z · log dµh
dµl
(s)
)
dµh(s) = − log
∫ (
dµl
dµh
(s)
)z
dµh(s).
It follows immediately that there is a simple connection between λh and λl
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λl(z) = λh(1− z).
It also follows from (16) that the interval I on which λh is finite contains [0, 1]. Since from
the definitions we have that λ′h(0) = Eh [`], and since λ′h(1) = El [`] by the relation between
λh and λl, two immediate corollaries of Theorem 22 are Lemmas 9 and 10. Furthermore,
as for every η between Eh [`] and El [`] the maximum in the definition of λ?h is achieved for
some z ∈ (0, 1), it follows that there is also a simple connection between λ?h and λ?l :
(17) λ?l (η) = λ
?
h(−η)− η.
We will accordingly state some results in terms of λh and λ
?
h only.
The following simple observation will be useful on several occasions:
Claim 24. Let ra = λ
?
h(0). Then ra = maxz∈(0,1) λh(z) = maxz∈(0,1) λl(z) = λ
∗
l (0), ra <
min {Eh [`] ,−El [`]}, and min {λ?h(ra), λ?l (ra)} > 0.
Proof. That ra = maxz∈(0,1) λh(z) = maxz∈(0,1) λl(z) = λ∗l (0) follows immediately from the
definitions. Now, note that Eh [`1] = λ
′
h(0). Thus ra < Eh[`] is a simple consequence of
the fact that ra = λ
?
h(0) = maxz≥0 λ(z), that this maximum is obtained in (0, 1), and that
λh is strictly concave. It follows from the same considerations that ra < −El [`] . Finally,
by Proposition 21, λ?h(ra) > 0 as λ
′
h(0) < ra < λ
′
h(1). The same arguments show that
ra < −El [`1] and λ?l (ra) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 11. Consider the case Θ = h. As shown in Lemma 8 the probability that
the agent makes a mistake is equal to the probability that the LLR is below L(αh). Thus,
Lemma 10 allows us to characterize this probability explicitly:
Ph
[
ait 6= αθ
]
= Ph
[
Rit ≤ L(αh)
]
= Ph
[
Rit ≤ o(t)
]
= e−λ
?
h(0)·t+o(t) .
An analogous argument yields that Pl
[
ait 6= αθ
]
= e−λ
?
l (0)·t+o(t). By (4) λ?h(0) = λ
?
l (0) . 
Appendix C. Observing the Last Action Unidirectionally
In this section we prove Proposition 13. Assuming that agent 1 only observes the last
action of agent 2, we would like to calculate Ph
[
at1 6= αh
]
. We can write this as
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh
]
= Ph
[
a1t 6= αh, a2t−1 = αh
]
+Ph
[
a1t 6= αh, a2t−1 = αl
]
+Ph
[
a1t 6= αh, a2t−1 6∈
{
αh, αl
}]
.
We already calculated the first term: it is equal to e−λ
?
h(−ra)·t+o(t). To calculate the second
term we write
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh and a2t−1 = αl
]
= Ph
[
a1t 6= αh | a2t−1 = αl
]×Ph [a2t−1 = αl] = e−λ?h(+ra)·t+o(t)×Ph [a2t−1 = αl] ,
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where the second equality is an application of (8). To estimate Ph
[
a2t−1 = α
l
]
we note
that the event a2t−1 = α
l is equal to the event P 2t−1 ≤ L(αl). Therefore, by Lemma 10,
Ph
[
a2t−1 = α
l
]
= e−λ
?(0)·t+o(t) = e−ra·t+o(t). Hence
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh and a2t−1 = αl
]
= e−(λ
?
h(ra)+ra)·t+o(t).
We are thus left with the estimation of the last addend, Ph
[
a1t 6= αh and a2t−1 6∈
{
αh, αl
}]
.
To this end we note that
Ph
[
a2t−1 6∈
{
αh, αl
}] ≤ P [R2t ≤ L(αh)] = e−ra·t+o(t),
where the last equality is another consequence of Lemma 10. Therefore, by (8),
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh and a2t−1 6∈
{
αh, αl
}]
= e−2rat+o(t).
We thus have that
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh
]
= e−λ
?
h(−ra)·t+o(t) + e−(λ
?
h(ra)+ra)·t+o(t) + e−2rat+o(t).
Recall that λ?l (η) = λ
?
h(−η)− η (by (17)) and so λ?h(ra) + ra = λ?l (−ra). Hence
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh
]
= e−λ
?
h(−ra)·t+o(t) + e−λ
?
l (−ra)·t+o(t) + e−2rat+o(t).
We show in Claim 25 below that λ?h(−ra) < 2ra, and likewise λ?l (−ra) < 2ra. Given this,
the last addend can be absorbed into the o(t) term, and we have that
Ph
[
a1t 6= αh
]
= e−ru·t+o(t),
where
ru = min {λ?h(−ra), λ∗l (−ra)} = ra + min {λ?l (ra), λ?h(ra)} .
By symmetry the same holds conditioned on Θ = l, and so we have shown that
P
[
a1t 6= αθ
]
= e−ru·t+o(t).
Claim 25. λ?h(−ra) < 2ra and λ?l (−ra) < 2ra.
Proof. We show the former; the proof of the latter is identical. To this end, we first note
that −ra > λ′h(1) (Claim 24). It thus follows that the maximum in
λ?h(−ra) = max
z≥0
λh(z) + raz
is also obtained in (0, 1), since the z in which it is obtained is the solution to λ′(z) = −ra.
Thus
λ?h(−ra) = max
z∈(0,1)
λh(z) + raz < max
z∈(0,1)
λh(z) + ra = 2ra. 
This also concludes the proof of Proposition 13.
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Appendix D. Observing all Actions Unidirectionally
In this section we show that when agent 1 observes all of agent 2’s actions, then the speed
of learning is identical to the speed in the case that she observes only the last action:
P
[
a1t 6= αθ
]
= e−ru·t+o(t).
One direction is immediate: observing all actions can only reduce the probability of error
relative to observing the last action, and so we know that
P
[
a1t 6= αθ
] ≤ e−ru·t+o(t).
It thus remains to be shown that
P
[
a1t 6= αθ
] ≥ e−ru·t+o(t).
To show this we show that the probability of a smaller event already satisfies this inequality.
Specifically, we condition (without loss of generality) on Θ = h and would like to consider the
case that agent 2 chooses the wrong action αl at all time periods up to time t. A technical
difficultly arises from the fact that for some priors and signal distributions it may be that
agent 2 never chooses αl up to some period s, since the prior is too high and each signal is
too weak. But of course there is some s such that P
[
a2t = α
l
]
> 0 for all t ≥ s. Accordingly,
we define for each t the action αminτ to lowest (i.e., having the lowest L) that is taken by
agent 2 with positive probability at time t. By the above, αminτ is equal to α
l for all t large
enough. We then prove the claim by showing that
(18) Ph
[
a1t 6= αh,∩1≤τ≤t{a2τ = αminτ }
]
= e−ru·t+o(t).
That is, we show that even when agent 1 observes agent 2 take the wrong action at every
period in which this is possible - even then agent 1 gets it wrong with probability that is
comparable to the probability of mistake when observing only the last action. Denote by Et
the event
Et = ∩1≤τ≤t
{
a2τ = α
min
τ
}
.
We first claim that
(19) Ph [Et] = e−ra·t+o(t)
and that
(20) Pl [Et] = e−o(t),
so that asymptotically this event has the same rate as the event a2t = α
l, for both possible
values of Θ. Given this, the analysis is identical to the one carried out in Sec. 4.3, and likewise
yields (18). It thus remains to calculate the conditional rates of Et, and in particular to show
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that they are the same at the rates of the event a2t = α
l. The key insight from which this
follows is the classical Ballot Theorem (Bertrand (1887)). It states that if (X1, X2, . . .) are
i.i.d. random variables, and if Yt =
∑t
τ=1Xτ then
1
t
P [Yt ≤ 0] ≤ P
[∩tτ=1 {Yτ ≤} 0] ≤ P [Yt ≤ 0] ,
and so in particular the event that Yt ≤ 0 has the same rate as the event that Yτ ≤ 0 for all
τ ≤ t. Instead of using the Ballot Theorem, we use our Theorem 23.
Indeed, noting that the event Et can be written as
Et = ∩1≤τ<t
{
R2τ ≤ L(αminτ )
}
.
Thus, if we define Xt = `t and yt = L(α
min
τ )− L0 then limt yt/t = 0 and Theorem 23 yields
the desired rates. This completes the proof that when agent 1 observes all the actions of
agent 2 then
P
[
a2t 6= αθ
]
= e−ru·t+o(t).
Appendix E. Bidirectional Observations
As in Section (4.3), we define for each t the action αmint to be the lowest action (i.e., having
the lowest L(α)) that is taken by any agent with positive probability at time t, and observe
that αmint is equal to α
l for all t large enough. We define
Gt = ∩ni=1 ∩tτ=1
{
aiτ = α
min
τ
}
.
Proof of Lemma 15. Note first, that each agent chooses action αmin1 in the first period if the
likelihood ratio she infers from her first private signal is at most L(αmin1 ). Hence
G1 =
⋂
1≤i≤n
{ai1 = αmin1 } =
⋂
1≤i≤n
{Ri1 ≤ L(αmin1 )}.
Thus G1 is an intersection of conditionally independent events. Assume now that all agents
choose the action αminτ up to period t−1; that is, that Gt−1 has occurred, which is a necessary
condition for Gt. What would cause any one of them to again choose α
min
t at period t? It
is easy to see that there will be some threshold qit such that, given Gt−1, agent i will choose
αmint if and only if her private likelihood ratio P
i
t is lower than q
i
t. By the symmetry of the
equilibrium, qit is independent of i, and so we will simply write it as qt. It follows that
Gt = Gt−1 ∩
⋂
1≤i≤n
{Rit ≤ qt}.
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Therefore, by induction, and if we denote q1 = L(α
min
τ ), we have that
Gt =
⋂
τ≤t
1≤i≤n
{Riτ < qτ}.
Now, note that the event that agent i chooses αminτ in all periods is not independent of the
event that some other agent j does the same. Still, by rearranging the above equation we
can write Gt as an intersection of conditionally independent events:
Gt =
⋂
1≤i≤n
( ⋂
1≤τ≤t
{Riτ ≤ qτ}
)
,
and if we denote
W it =
⋂
1≤τ≤t
{Riτ ≤ qτ},
then the W it ’s are conditionally independent, and
Gt =
⋂
1≤i≤n
W it . 
Proof of Proposition 16. Agent 1’s log-likelihood ratio conditional on ∩ni=1W it−1 at time t
equals
L1t = P
1
t + log
Ph
[∩ni=1W it−1]
Pl
[∩ni=1W it−1] .
Since the W it−1’s are conditionally independent, we have that
L1t = P
1
t +
n∑
i=1
log
Ph
[
W it−1
]
Pl
[
W it−1
] .
Finally, by symmetry, all the numbers in the sum are equal, and
L1t = P
1
t + (n− 1) · log
Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] .
Now, the last addend is just a number. Therefore, if we denote
qt = L(α
l)− (n− 1) · log Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] ,(21)
then
L1n = R
1
t − qt + L(αl),
and L1t ≤ L(αl) (and thus a1t = αl) whenever P 1t ≤ qt. 
We recall the recursive relation between qt and W
i
t :
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qt = L(α
min
t )− (n− 1) · log
Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] and W it = ⋂
1≤τ≤t
{Riτ ≤ qt}.
Claim 26. qt ≥ L(αmint ) for all t.
Proof. Let Fh and Fl be the cumulative distribution functions of a private log-likelihood
ratio `, conditioned on Θ = h and Θ = l, respectively. Then it is easy to see that Fh
stochastically dominates Fl, in the sense that Fl(x) ≥ Fh(x) for all x ∈ R. It follows that
the joint distribution of {Riτ}τ≤t conditioned on Θ = h dominates the same distribution
conditioned on Θ = l, and so Ph [W 1t ] ≤ Pl [W 1t ]. Hence qt ≥ L(αmint ). 
Claim 27. There is a constant C > 0 such that Pl [W 1t ] ≥ C for all t.
Proof. Since the events W 1t are decreasing, we will prove the claim by showing that
lim
t→∞
Pl
[
W 1t
]
> 0,
which by definition is equivalent to
lim
t→∞
Pl
[∩τ≤t {Riτ ≤ qτ}] > 0.
Since qt ≥ L(αmint ), it suffices to prove that
lim
t→∞
Pl
[∩τ≤t {Riτ ≤ L(αminτ )}] > 0.
To prove the above, note that agents eventually learn Θ, since the private signals are
informative. Therefore, conditioned on Θ = l, the limit of Rit as t tends to infinity must be
−∞. Thus, with probability 1, for all t large enough it does hold that R1t ≤ L(αminτ ). Since
each of the events W 1t has positive probability, and by the Markov property of the random
walk R1t , it follows that the event ∩τ
{
Riτ ≤ L(αminτ )
}
has positive probability. Finally, by
monotonicity
lim
t→∞
Pl
[
W 1t
]
> Pl
[∩τ {Riτ ≤ L(αminτ )}] > 0.

It follows immediately from this claim and the definition of qt that
(22) lim
t→∞
qt
t
= −(n− 1) lim
t
1
t
logPh
[
W 1t−1
]
t
,
provided that the limit exists.
Let q = lim inft→∞ qt/t. Since W it = ∩tτ=1 {Riτ ≤ qτ}, it follows from Theorem 23 that
− lim t→∞1
t
logPh
[
W it
]
= λ?h(q),
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provided that q > infz λ
′
h(z). But q ≥ 0 (Claim 26), and so this indeed holds. Thus, by (22),
we have proved the following claim:
Proposition 28. The limit q = limt→∞
qt
t
exists, and
q = (N − 1)λ?h(q) .
Proof of Claim 17. Recall that λ?h is strictly convex, and that λ
?
h(D) = 0, where we denote
D = Eh [`] . Hence
λ?h(q) <
q
D
λ?h(D) +
D − q
D
λ?h(0)
=
D − q
D
λ?h(0).
Substituting (n− 1)λ?h(q) for q and simplifying yields
λ?h(q) <
D
D/λ?h(0) + n− 1
.
Since λ?h(0) < D (Claim 24) we have shown that
nλ?h(q) < D,
and so
n
n− 1q = nλ
?
h(q) < D . 
Proof of Claim 18. Since ru = min {λ?l (−ra), λ?h(−ra)}, in order to prove the claim we need
to show that 2 · q < λ?h(−ra); the corresponding condition for the low state will follow by the
same argument.
We consider two cases. If q ≥ ra then λ?h(q) ≥ λ?h(0), since q = λ?h(q) and ra = λ?h(0). By
the monotonicity of λ?h (Proposition 21) it then follows that q ≤ 0. But this is false (e.g.,
since it implies that q = λ?h(q) ≥ λ?h(0) > 0), and so we have reached a contradiction.
Hence q < ra, in which case λ
?
h(−q) < λ?h(−ra), since λ?h is strictly decreasing (Proposition
21). Now, since q = λ?h(q), we have that 2 · q = q + λ?h(q) = λ∗l (−q), where the last
equality follows from the general fact (see Appendix B) that λ?l (η) = λ
?
h(−η) − η. Thus
2 · q < λ?h(−ra). 
We now turn to showing that conditioned on groupthink - that is, conditioned on the
event Gt - all agents have, with high probability, a private LLR R
i
t that indicates the correct
action. In fact, the LLR is arbitrarily close to t · q, the asymptotic threshold for Rit above
which groupthink ends.
Theorem 29. For every  > 0 it holds that
lim
t→∞
Ph
[
Rit > t · (q − ) for all i | Gt
]
= 1,
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where, as above, q is the solution to q = (n− 1)λ?h(q).
Proof. By Theorem 22 we know that
lim t→∞ − 1
t
logPh
[
Rit ≤ t · (q − )
]
= λ?h(q − ).
Since λ?h(q − ) > λ?h(q) it follows that
lim t→∞ − 1
t
logPh [At] = n · λ?h(q − ) > n · λ?h(q),
where At is the event {Rit ≤ t · (q − ) for all i}. Since for t high enough the event At is
included in Gt, and since
lim t→∞ − 1
t
logPh [Gt] = n · λ?h(q),
it follows that Ph [At | Gt] decays exponentially with t. Hence Ph [Act | Gt]→t 1, which is the
claim we set to prove. 
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 7. We assume that each agent i observes a Normal
signal sit ∼ N (mθ, n) with mean
mΘ =
+1 if Θ = h−1 if Θ = l
and variance n.18 Note, that for any number of agents the precision of the joined signal equals
1, and thus the total information the group receives every period is fixed, independent of n.
We assume that the prior belief assigns probability one-half to each state p0 = 1/2 and
that there are two actions A = {l, h} and each agent just wants to match the state, as in
the “matching the state” example (Section 2.5.1). As in the first period each agent bases
her decision only on her own private signal, she takes the action h whenever her signal si1 is
greater than 0 and the action l otherwise:
ai1 =
h si1 > 0l si1 ≤ 0 .
18All results generalize to non-symmetric means, since only the difference |mh − ml| enters the Bayesian
calculations.
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The private likelihood of each agent after observing the first t signals is given by
Rit = log
∏t
τ=1 exp
(
−(s
i
τ−1)
2
2n
)
∏t
τ=1 exp
(
− (siτ+1)2
2n
)
=
2
n
t∑
τ=1
siτ .
The probability that an agent takes the correct action Θ in period 1 (conditional only on
her own first period signal) is thus given by
Ph
[
Θ = ai1
]
= Ph
[
si1 ≥ 0
]
= 1− Φ
(−mh√
n
)
= Φ
(
1√
n
)
.
By symmetry, Pl[ai1 = Θ] = Φ(1/
√
n) as well. Denote pin = Φ
(
1√
n
)
and by w1 = |{i ∈
n : ai1 = h}| the number of agents taking the action ai1 = h. Let κn = log(pin/(1− pin)), and
note that 2/
√
n ≥ κn ≥ 1/
√
n.
As the action of each agent is independent, the LLR of agent i at the beginning of period
2 is given by
Li2 =
2
n
2∑
τ=1
siτ − (2w1 − n)κn − sgn(si1)κn .
We define the private part of the LLR at the beginning of period 2 as
Rˆi2 =
2
n
2∑
τ=1
siτ − sgn(si1)κn
and the public part of the LLR as
Lp2 = (2w1 − n)κn .
Let αm be the action that the majority of the agents chose in the first period (with αm = l
in case of a tie). Note that αm = h iff L
p
2 > 0. Let Et be the event that all agents take the
first period majority action αm in all subsequent periods up to time t, i.e., a
i
s = αm for all
1 < s ≤ t.
Proposition 30. The probability of Et goes to one as the number of agents goes to infinity,
i.e.,
lim
n→∞
P [Et] = 1 .
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This is a rephrasing of Theorem 7. We in fact provide a finitary statement and prove that
P [Et] ≥ 1− 20 · t ·
√
logn
n
.
We first show that the the probability of the event E2 that all agents take the same action
in period 2 goes to one. The LLR of agent i at the beginning of period 2 is given by
Li2 =
2
N
2∑
τ=1
siτ + (2w1 − n)κn − sgn(si1)κn .
= Rˆi2 + L
p
2 .
To show that E2 has high probability we show that with high probability it holds that L
p
2,
the public belief induced by the first period actions, is large (in absolute value) and that the
private beliefs are all small. Intuitively, this holds since both are (approximately) zero mean
Gaussian, with Lp2 having constant variance and Rˆ
i
2 having variance of order 1/
√
n. It will
then follow that with high probability the signs of Lp2 and L
i
2 are equal for all i, which is a
rephrasing of the definition of E2.
Let A be the event that all of the private signals in the first t periods have absolute values
at most M = 4
√
n log n. Using the union bound (over the agents and time periods), this
happens except with probability at most
P [Ac] ≤ t · n · P [|sit| > M] ≤ t · n · 2 · Φ(−12M/√n
)
;
the 1/2 factor in the argument of Φ is taken to account for the fact that the private signals
do not have zero mean. Since Φ(−x) < e−x22 for all x < −1, we have that
P [Ac] ≤ 2 · t
n
.
Let
Rˆiτ =
2
n
τ∑
τ ′=1
siτ ′ − sgn(si1)κn.
Thus the event A implies that
|Rˆiτ | ≤
2
n
· t ·M + κn ≤ 8 · t ·
√
log n
n
+
2√
n
≤ 9 · t ·
√
log n
n
.
Let B be the event that the absolute value of the public LLR Lp2 is at least 9 · t ·
√
logn
n
;
this is chosen so that the intersection of A and B implies E2. Conditioned on Θ = h,
the random variable w1 has the unimodal binomial distribution B(n, pin), which has mode
b(n+ 1) · pinc. The probability at this mode is easily shown to be at most 1/
√
n. The same
applies conditioned on Θ = l. It follows that the probability of Bc, which by definition is
equal to the probability that |w1− n/2| ≤ 1κn9 · t ·
√
logn
n
, is at most 2
κn
9 · t ·
√
logn
n
times the
43
probability of the mode, or
P [Bc] ≤ 2
κn
9 · t ·
√
log n
n
· 1√
n
≤ 18 · t ·
√
log n
n
.
Together with the bound on the probability of A, we have that
P [A and B] ≥ 1− 20 · t ·
√
log n
n
,
and in particular
P [E2] ≥ 1− 20 ·
√
log n
n
.
We now claim that A ∩ B implies Et. To see this, note that as A ∩ B implies E2, the
agents all observe at period 2 that no other agent has a strong enough signal to dissent
with the first period majority. This only strengthens their belief in the first period majority,
requiring them an even higher (in absolute value) threshold than Lp2 to choose another action;
the formal proof of this statement is identical to the proof of Claim 26. But since, under the
event A ∩ B, each of their private LLRs Rˆiτ is weaker than Lp2 for all τ ≤t, they will not do
so at period 3, or, by induction, in any of the periods prior to period t. This completes the
proof of 30, and thus of Theorem 7.
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